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The Scope Of Attorney

Advertising In Illinois
ROBERT

J. FRANCO*

ANNE SCHEITLIN JOHNSON**

Attorneys have long been allowed to advertise their services,'
with restrictions. 2 But with the extension of constitutional protection
to commercial free speech,3 the professions were given access to
marketing techniques which were formerly unknown. Once the toehold
had been established, it was not long until commercial free speech
4
was extended to attorney advertising.
Traditionally, attorney advertising was eschewed as a blemish
upon the profession. 5 The theory was that lawyers, as members of a
6
noble profession, were motivated by public service rather than profit.
That the provision of legal services was highly individualized, not a
homogeneous commodity which could be sold or traded. However,
these aged concepts began to fall, exposing lawyers to the perils of
the marketplace and enveloping lawyers in market competition.
I.

THE APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO
COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The traditional rule permitting advertising restrictions for professionals changed with Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
* Grinnell College, Southern Illinois University, B.A. 1980; Rutgers University, M.A. 1983; lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, J.D. 1984. Mr. Franco is an
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** Florida Southern College, B.A. 1982; IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law,
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1. See, People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Gilbert, 263 Ill. 85, 87, 104 N.E.

1082, 1083 (1914) (Discussing attorney advertising).
2. See, People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Berezniak, 292 Ill. 305, 312-14,

127 N.E.
3.
(1976).
4.
5.
6.

36, 39 (1920) (Guidelines for attorney advertising).
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
See, infra pp. 6-7, nn. 20-22.
Bates, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
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Council,7 which granted an extension of constitutional protection to
commercial free speech. 8 There, a Virginia regulation declared that a
pharmacist who advertised prices was guilty of "unprofessional conduct," subjecting him to monetary sanctions, license suspension or
revocation.
In supporting the ban, the Board pointed to the "maintenance
of professionalism." Through competition, the Board theorized, a
pharmacist would economize at a customer's expense. Such economies
would compel consumers to price-shop, undermining a pharmacist's
effort to monitor the drug use of regular customers. Finally, advertising would reduce the pharmacist from a skilled and specialized
craftsman to a mere "retailer. ' 9
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
[C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus
performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources
in a free enterprise system [citation omitted]. In short, such
speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.' 0
The Court emphasized that while commercial speech warranted
limited First Amendment protection, some forms of state regulation
were permissible. The Court reserved judgment, however, regarding
the constitutionality of state regulation of physicians or attorneys."
7. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
8. Virginia Pharmacy held, for the first time, that the First Amendment
prohibits certain forms of regulation over commercial free speech. Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985). "There is no longer any room to
doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than
that afforded 'noncommercial speech."' Id. at 637.
9. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 768.
10. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364 (1976) citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761765 (1975).
11. The full footnote reads:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other
professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions,
may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers,
for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain
kinds of advertising.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n. 25.
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II.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

THE APPLICATION OF COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH TO ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING

Two years later, the Court addressed the question left unanswered
in Virginia Pharmacy and applied the novel commercial free speech
rule to attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.' 2 Prior
to Bates, the issue of attorney advertising had been left to selfregulation by the profession and a hodge-podge of state restrictions.' 3
Bates changed the analysis, finding attorney advertising to be constitutionally permissible commercial free speech. Bates held that the
truthful advertising of routine legal services is protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendment, against blanket State prohibition. 4 The
effect was to allow attorney advertising in print, provided that it was
not misleading or arbitrary. Given the judicial imprimatur allowing
such advertising, the Court left further regulation to the states.
In Bates, two lawyers had established a legal clinic catering to
those of moderate income. In a challenge to the prohibition of
attorney advertising by the State Bar of Arizona, the appellants ran
an advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation setting forth a
fee schedule. 5 In appealing their censure, appellants contended that
the advertising bar was violative of the First Amendment.16
The countervailing argument was the State's right to police the
professions operating within the state's borders. The argument supporting a continued ban on advertising comprised six categories:
A.

THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON PROFESSIONALISM

The State Bar argued that advertising would bring about commercialization, which would undermine the attorney's sense of dignity
and self-esteem:
The hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession's service orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate
balance between the lawyer's need to earn and his obligation
selflessly to serve. Advertising is also said to erode the client's
trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives that the lawyer
12. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
13. Id. at 402 (Powell and Stewart, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
14. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 454-68 (1978) reh'g denied,
439 U.S. 883 (1978).
15. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354, 389-91.
16. Appellants also argued that the advertising bar violated the Sherman Act.
However, the Court held that the "state action" exception under the Sherman Act
was applicable, hence no violation. Id. at 359.
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is motivated by profit,"7 his confidence that the attorney is
acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is jeopardized. And advertising is said to tarnish the public image of
profession."8
In response, the Court noted that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a disclosure of the fees to be charged upon the
attorney being retained.' 9 If the commercial basis for the relationship
is to be disclosed once the client is in the office, it does not seem
20
unreasonable to allow the disclosure before the client arrives.
Moreover, the State Bar argued that advertising would diminish
the prestige of the bar, ignoring the tradition of public service and
subordinating the practice of law to a trade.
It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of
etiquette and not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great
Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather than
as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on
21
"trade" as unseemly.
The Court dismissed the "public service" argument, recognizing the
economic realities attendant to the contemporary practice of law.
B. THE INHERENTLY MISLEADING NATURE OF ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING

The State Bar argued that the advertising prohibition should be
maintained as legal services are highly individualized so as to prevent
17. At oral argument, appellee noted profit motive underlying the practice of
law. As such, he termed the argument that the practice of law is non-commercial as
"sanctimonious humbug." Id. at 368, n. 19.
18. Id. at 368.
19. Id. at 369. Citing to ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical
Consideration EC 2-19 (1976)-see Rule 12.8.6 (p. 67).
20. Bates, 433 U.S. at 369.
21. Id. at 371-372, n. 24, (Citing H. Drinker, Legal Ethics, 5, 210-211 (1953)),
"The British view may be changing. An official British Commission recently presented
reports to Parliament recommending that solicitors be permitted to advertise. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Services of Solicitors in England and Wales: A
Report on the Supply of Services of Solicitors in England and Wales in Relations to
Restrictions on Advertising 39-41 (1976); Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
Services of Solicitors in Scotland: A Report on the Supply of Services of Solicitors
in Scotland in Relation to Restrictions on Advertising 31-34 (1976). A companion
study concerning barristers recommended that no changes be made in the restrictions
upon their advertising, chiefly because barristers are not hired directly by laymen.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Barristers' Services: A Report on the Supply
of Barristers' Services in Relation to Restrictions on Advertising 21-24 (1976)."
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an informed comparison, that consumers are unable to diagnose their
needs beforehand and that advertising will substitute attorney mar22
keting ability for attorney skill and competence.
The Court noted that the only services which would lend them23
selves to fee schedules and thus advertising would be routine services.
Though nominally "routine" services would have unique twists, such
24
would not make attorney advertising misleading.
Similarly, the notion that consumers cannot diagnose their legal
needs would not apply to routine matters such as uncontested divorces
or the preparation of a will. While clients may have unique needs,
they are certainly able to determine if they require a will or another
routine service.
On the issue of criteria for selecting an attorney, the Court
believed that the free flow of non-misleading information to consumers is preferable to the restriction of such information. 2 With proper
policing by the state, the Court felt most of the problems associated
with attorney advertising would be eliminated.
22. See, Id. at 373 n. 27, (Citing Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 714 (1977)). "[A] moments reflection reveals

that the same argument can be made for barbers; rarely are two haircuts identical,
but that does not mean that barbers cannot quote a standard price. Lawyers perform
countless relatively standardized services which vary somewhat in complexity but not
so much as to make each job utterly unique." Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
23. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
24. In fact, the Maricopa County Bar Association (Arizona) had a minimum
fee schedule until they were so prohibited by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). Accordingly, the Court disputed the contention that standardized
fees are inherently misleading. See, Bates, 433 U.S. at 373.
25. See, Bates 433 U.S. at 374 n. 30, "Since in a referral system relying on
reputation an attorney's future business is partially dependent on current performance, such a system has the benefit both of providing a mechanism for disciplining
misconduct and of creating an incentive for an attorney to do a better job for his
present clients. Although the system may have worked when the typical lawyer
practices in a small, homogeneous community in which ascertaining reputational
information was easy for a consumer, commentators have seriously questioned its

current efficacy. See, e.g., B. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means,
128-135 (1970); Note, Bar Restrictionson Dissemination of Information about Legal
Services, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 483, 500 (1974); Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar
Restraints on Advertising and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1135, 1156-

1157. The trends of urbanization and specialization long since have moved the typical
practice of law from its small-town setting. See, R. Pound, The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times 242 (1953). Information as to the qualifications of
lawyers is not available to many. And, if available, it may be inaccurate or biased.

See, Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising and Solicitation
by Attorneys, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1135, 1156-57 (1976)."
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THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

The State Bar further argued that allowing attorney advertising
would only "stir up" litigation. The Court responded that attorney
advertising would not provide the impetus for the filing of frivolous
claims by litigious persons. Rather, the Court reasoned that persons
with such an inclination would proceed irrespective of attorney advertising. Moreover, this interest was far outweighed by the dynamics
of providing legal services to people of moderate means.2 6
D.

HTE UNDESIRABLE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING

It was alleged that advertising would increase the cost of practic-

ing law, which would be passed on to clients. Alternatively, increased
costs would bar or deter the entry of young lawyers into the market.
But the Court noted that at present, attorneys are isolated from
competition relieving attorneys of competitive pricing. But with advertising and competition, legal fees would be reduced. Additionally,
attorney advertising would allow for a young lawyer's entry into the
market. The alternative would be to limit the lawyer to his contacts
within the community to generate business.
E. THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF ADVERTISING ON THE QUALITY OF
SERVICE

The Court noted that restraints on advertising are an ineffective
means of deterring shoddy work.
F.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF ENFORCEMENT

The State Bar's final argument was that the public may be harmed
by misleading or deceptive advertising. However, the Court surmised
that attorneys would conduct themselves as they always had. Simply,
advertising would not provide a temptation for attorneys to violate
26. "[Tlhe middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served
adequately by the legal profession." Bates, 433 U.S. at 376, citing ABA, Revised
Handbook on PrepaidLegal Services 2 (1972). See, Bates, supra, n. 33. Among the
reasons for this under utilization is fear of the cost, and an inability to locate a
suitable lawyer. See Id. nn. 22, supra. Advertising can help solve this acknowledged
problem: Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a
supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange.
The disciplinary rule at issue has likely served to burden access to legal services,
particularly for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing unrestrained advertising would be in accord with the bar's obligation to 'facilitate the
process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully
available.' ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-1 (1976)."
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their oaths or the ethical canons. Moreover, the placement of attorney
advertising under the spotlight of public scrutiny would tend to
eliminate misleading or deceptive statements through policing by the
appropriate regulatory authority.
In weighing the constitutional imperative against the adverse
effects of advertising, the Court declared that "[t]he choice between
the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers arising from
its free flow was seen as precisely the choice 'that the First Amendment
makes for us." '' 27 Drawing upon Virginia Pharmacy, the Court expressed its disfavor for disciplinary rules which inhibit the free flow
29
of information 2 and keep the public in ignorance.

In applying Virginia Pharmacy to the issue of the advertising fee
schedules in print media of general circulation, the Court noted that
the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
allowed listings in telephone directories which include the attorney's
name, address, and telephone number.30 "We recognize, however,
that an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare would provide
scant nourishment." 3' Hence, the Court felt that the public was
entitled to greater information3 2 and believed that the disclosure of
fees was constitutionally cognizable. On balance, the Court found no
compelling reason to broadly suppress attorney advertising.33
27. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 365, quoting, FTC v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967).
28. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988). "[Wlhen men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe...
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wished safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." (Citing Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)). Id. at 483 (ellipse
in original).
29. Id.
30. Bates, 433 U.S. at 367, n. 18. See, DR 2-102(a)(6) (1976) (allowing the
advertising of such information).
31. Bates, 433 U.S. at 367.
32. The Court noted that "[aidvertising, though entirely commercial, may often
convey information of import to significant issues of the day. And commercial speech
serves to inform the public of the availability, nature and prices of products and
services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests
in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking." 433 U.S. at 364 (citations
omitted).
33. Prior to finding the advertisement at issue worthy of first amendment
protection, however, the Court held the first amendment overbreadth doctrine
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Although the Bates Court found attorney advertising to be constitutionally protected, it was not without restrictions. The Court
recognized that, "[a]dvertising that is false, deceptive or misleading
is subject to restraint." '3 4 The state, therefore, retains a strong interest
in regulating attorney advertising. This special interest by the state
justifies the application of narrowly drawn rules to prohibit solicitation that is "misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of
deception or improper influence." 35 While it was clear after Bates
that states could no longer completely bar advertising by attorneys, it
was unclear how far they could extend their regulation.
III.

THE MODE OF SOLICITATION DEFINES THE RESTRICTION

Bates was followed by In Re Primus36 and Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Assoc. ,a7
decided on the same day. Primus and Ohralik presented
a "tale of two lawyers," 38 one engaged in constitutionally protected
solicitation and the other, not. Each case presented the Court with a
unique factual setting upon which to clarify the states' ability to
regulate attorney advertising.
In Primus, the attorney was an officer in and a cooperating
lawyer with her local branch of the American Civil Liberties Union.
inapplicable to professional advertising. The overbreadth doctrine permits a person
to challenge a statute which potentially infringes upon protected speech on the
grounds that even though his speech was not affected, a possibility exists that some
protected speech might be chilled. The Court considered, and refused to apply, the
doctrine in the context of advertising, stating:
[T]he justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly,
if at all, in the ordinary commercial context . .

.

. [Tihere are 'common

sense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties. Since
advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.
Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the scope of protection
are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a product
or service that he provides, and presumably, he can determine more readily
than others whether his speech is truthful and protected. Since overbreadth
has been described by this Court as 'strong medicine,' which 'has been
employed ...sparingly and only as a last resort,' we decline to apply it to
professional advertising, a context where it is not necessary to further its
intended objective. Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted).
34. 433 U.S. at 383.
35. See, In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978).
36. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
37. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
38. Primus, 436 U.S. at 440 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Upon invitation, Ms. Primus addressed a group of women who were
sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition of continued
Medicaid assistance. Following the meeting, Ms. Primus wrote a
woman to whom she had spoken at the meeting, requesting the woman
to consider suing over her sterilization. Ms. Primus advised that
representation would be provided free-of-charge through the ACLU
39
and requested the opportunity to further discuss the case.
Thereafter, the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly censured
Ms. Primus for soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU. In Primus,
the United States Supreme Court reiterated the power of the states to
40
regulate the practice of professions within the state's boundaries.
However, a state's right to regulate the bar must yield in instances of
41
constitutionally protected expression and association. The issue as
seen by the Primus Court was whether a solicitation by letter had
occurred between an attorney and a person with whom the legal issue
had been discussed, where the solicitation included an offer of free
representation in order to advance the attorney's personal political
42
beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objective of the ACLU. As
such, Primus involved a competition between associational and free
speech protections against the South Carolina disciplinary rules.
Primus recognized that constitutionally protected solicitation arises
where associations seek to provide low-cost, effective legal representation to their members. 43 A right which a state may not abridge. As
such, the Court condoned the Primus solicitation as it was nonremunerative in nature and was intended to further the political
objectives of both Ms. Primus and the ACLU.
Ohralik is unique, turning upon the in-person solicitation of
accident victims." There, the attorney visited one accident victim in
her hospital room, finding her in traction. He then visited a passenger45
in first victim's car, at her home, attempting to solicit her case.
39. Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-16.
40. Primus, 436 U.S. at 422.
41. See, NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
42. Primus, supra 436 U.S. at 422.
43. Id. 436 U.S. at 426. Accord, Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S.
1, 8 (1964); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
44. The Bates Court envisioned the problems attendant the in person solicitation
of accident victims: "[I1n - person solicitation of clients - at the hospital room or the
accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue influence - by attorneys or
their agents or 'runners.' Activity of that kind might well pose dangers of overreacting
and misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertisement."
Bates, 433 U.S. at 366.
45. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring
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With respect to the second victim, a minor, the attorney concealed a
tape recorder under his coat to record the victim's parol assent to
representation. That representation was subsequently vitiated by the
victim, yet the attorney continued to advise an insurance company
that he represented her.
As such, Ohralik was distinguished from Bates as the former
constituted in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. 46 The Ohralik
Court found such a contact to be "inconsistent with the profession's

ideal of the attorney-client relationship."4 7
The gravamen of the Court's analysis was that commercial free
speech was entitled to limited constitutional protection, not plenary
protection:

We have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in
an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and

other varieties of speech. Ibid. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech

alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the

force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter
kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to
such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial

speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible
in the realm of noncommercial expression.48
in the judgment) ("What is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior here is not so
much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he
performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it."). Id. at
470.
46. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 at 641
(1984). "Our decision in Ohralik was largely grounded on the substantial differences
between face-to-face solicitation and the advertising we had held permissible in Bates.
In-person solicitation by a lawyer, we concluded, was a practice rife with possibilities
for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright
fraud. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-465. In addition, we noted that in-person solicitation
presents unique regulatory difficulties because it is "not visible or otherwise open to
public scrutiny." Id. at 466. These unique features of in-person solicitation by
lawyers, we held, justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in
such solicitation for pecuniary gain, but we were careful to point out that "in-person
solicitation of professional employment by a lawyer does not stand on a par with
truthful advertising about the availability and terms of routine legal services." Id. at
455.
47. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
48. Id. at 455-456 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
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While truthful print advertising is within the constitutional ambit, this
protection does not extend to face-to-face solicitation. In sum, the49
standard of judicial scrutiny is less in instances of a personal contact.
The rationale for the diminished standard arises from the problems
attendant a face-to-face solicitation. Distinct from a public advertisement, an in-person solicitation:
"may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without an opportunity for comparison or reflection.
The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide
a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps
uninformed decision-making; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, super50
visory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual."
In balancing the First Amendment protection against a state's
interests in policing the professions within its borders, the Ohralik
Court noted the remunerative employment is only marginally related
to First Amendment concerns. As such, the fulcrum supporting the
competing interests is pecuniary interest. 1
ITihe rules are based in part on deeply ingrained feelings of
tradition, honor and service. Lawyers have for centuries emrather than the earning
phasized that the promotion of justice,
52
profession.
the
of
goal
the
is
of fees,
A lawyer who engages in the face-to-face solicitation of a client
may be inclined to subordinate the best interests of the client to his
own pecuniary interests. While this problem may arise in any attorney
client relationship, personal solicitations may be particularly susceptible to this conflict.53
Because of the dangers inherent in personal solicitations, there is
no requirement by the State to prove harm. The reasoning is that the
Disciplinary Rules are prophylactic, seeking to eliminate harm before
49. Id. at 457.

50. Id. at 457. The disciplinary rule does not prevent an attorney from giving
unsolicited advice, but prohibits an attorney accepting employment arising from such
advise. Id. at 458.

51. States have an interest in regulating their professions. "The interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the

courts."' Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
52. Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation By Lawyers,
25 U. Chi. Law Rev. 674, 674 (1958).

53. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461, 462, nn. 19, 20.
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it occurs, which is within the state's interest. In a situation as presented
in Ohralik:
which is inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms
of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and
enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from
harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed ....
Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for the State
to presume that in-person solicitation by lawyers more often
than not will be injurious to the person solicited.14
The Court noted that often "in-person solicitation is not visible or
otherwise open to public scrutiny. [There may be] no witness other
than the lawyer and the lay person solicited, rendering it difficult or
impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place.""
These unique features of in-person solicitation justify a prophylactic
rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain. Unlike the potential client being solicited in person, the
reader of an advertisement can "avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."16 As such, the Court's
decision in Ohralik turned upon face-to-face solicitation for profit.
The clear import of Ohralik is that an in-person solicitation yields
a different constitutional standard, granting states broad regulatory
authority. In contrast to Primus, the state interest arising from such
in-person solicitations is particularly acute where the solicitation is
for financial gain.
Reading Primus and Ohralik together, it is clear that the mode
of solicitation is crucial. According to Ohralik, states may ban all inperson solicitation as that practice is "rife with the possibilities for
overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence,
and outright fraud. 5 7 More, there is no way for the states to police
this type of conduct as it is not subject to public scrutiny."

54. Id. 436 U.S. at 464-66. See particularly, n. 23.

55. Id. at 466.

56. (Citing "Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21, quoted in Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,

320 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the target of the solicitation may have difficulty
avoiding being importuned and distressed even if the lawyer seeking employment is
entirely well meaning. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)"). Id. at 465,
n. 25.
57. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641, citing, Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-66.
58. Id. at 464-65.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
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IV.

THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST

An important point in the evolution of the commercial speech
doctrine lies in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York. 9 At issue was the Commission's regulation
prohibiting promotional advertising by electric utilities. In finding the

prohibition unconstitutional, the Court formulated a four-part analysis that has become the standardized test for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech:

At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to

come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful

activityoand not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the

asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,

and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. °
It was unclear, however, whether the newly devised test for

evaluating commercial restrictions on commercial speech would be

applicable in the context of attorney advertising. The Court had
previously indicated in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy that attorney

advertising may present greater potential for deception than commercial speech in general, 6' and may be entitled to greater restrictions.

59. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
60. Id. 447 U.S. at 566. The Court recently clarified the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (1989). In Fox, the Court was faced with the issue of
U.S.
whether governmental restrictions upon commercial speech were invalid if they went
beyond the least restrictive means to achieve the desired end. The Court held that
governmental restrictions need not be the absolute least restrictive means to achieved
the desired end. Instead, there must be a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends," Id. at 3035, quoting, Posadasde Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 at 344 (1989), a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served."
Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3035, citing, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
61. See, In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982);See, Note, ConstitutionalRegulation of "Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation" By Attorneys After Shapero - A
Proposed Rule of Conduct, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 281, 297 (1989) "(issue framed narrowly
to determine propriety of price advertising only because advertising relating to quality
of legal services might be deceptive or misleading); Virginia Pharmacysupra, note 3,
425 U.S. 748, 773 n. 25 (1976) (physician and attorney advertising may present
enhanced possibility for confusion and deception)." Citing, Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
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THE APPLICATION OF CENTRAL HUDSON TO ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING

Two years later the Court applied the Central Hudson test to an
attorney advertising case in In Re R.M.J.62 There, an attorney sent
out a general mailing of professional cards announcing the opening
of his law office. The mailing was in violation of Missouri's ethical
rules which allowed distribution only to personal friends, relatives,
lawyers, clients and former clients, but specifically prohibited the
mailing of professional cards to prospective clients. 63 Additionally,
the lawyer placed several advertisements which did not conform to
the specific requirements of a different ethical rule. 64
The Missouri court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
disciplinary rules, expressly refused to apply the Central Hudson test,
stating: "We respectfully decline to enter the thicket of attempting to
anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judgments of a majority
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court. '65
The United States Supreme Court, however, applied the test
without hesitation and found the rules to be unconstitutional. 66 The
Court noted that while the information included in the advertisements
did not strictly conform to the governing rule, the advertisements
were not misleading and posed no "apparent danger of deception. ' 67
The Court further found unconstitutional the absolute prohibition
against direct mailings of announcements to the general public. 68
Soon after R.M.J., the Court had the opportunity to apply the
Central Hudson test in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.69
In Zauderer, the subject attorney ran two advertisements. The first
pertained to defending "drunk driving" cases. According to the
advertisement, he would refund the fee if the defendant were convicted. 70 The second advertisement related to Zauderer's solicitation
7
of Dalkon Shield personal injury cases. '
62. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
63. Id. at 198.
64. Id.

65. In Re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980) (emphasis in original),

rev'd 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
66. In Re R.M.J. 455 U.S. at 207.
67. Id. at 205.
68. Id. at 206.

69. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
70. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1985).

cases.

71. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630, n. 2, for a description of Dalkon Shield
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The Ohio Supreme Court held that the "drunk driving" advertisement was objectionable as it effectively was a contingent fee
arrangement which was prohibited in criminal cases. The court further
objected to the Dalkon Shield advertisement as it contained an
illustration 72 and 7failed to disclose the particulars about the contingent
fee arrangement .
The United States Supreme Court found the Dalkon Shield
74
advertisements to be neither false nor misleading. Accordingly, and
in such instances, the state has the burden of establishing that the
prohibition of such solicitations directly advances a substantial government interest. 75 As such, Ohio could not discipline an attorney for
running advertisements geared toward persons with a specific legal
problem. 76 Relying on its previous decisions the Court stated:
72. Id. at 636. The illustration was not deemed misleading by the United States
Supreme Court. The prohibition on illustrations "fails for much the same reasons as
does the application of the self-recommendation and solicitation rules. The use of
illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important communicative functions:
it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's message, and it may also
serve to impart information directly. Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled
to the First Amendment protection afforded verbal commercial speech: restrictions
on the use of visual media of expression in advertising must survive scrutiny under
the CentralHudson test." Id. at 647. Because the advertisement was subject to public
scrutiny, and hence review by Ohio, the ban on illustrations cannot stand. "Given
the possibility of policing the use of illustrations in advertisements on a case-by-case
basis, the prophylactic approach taken by Ohio cannot stand; hence, appellant may
not be disciplined for his use of an accurate and nondeceptive illustration." Id. at
649.
73. Id.at 636.
74. Id.at 649. The Central Hudson test supplies the rule of decision. "Because
the illustration for which appellant was disciplined is an accurate representation of
the Dalkon Shield and has no features that are likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse
the reader, the burden is on the State to present a substantial governmental interest
justifying the restriction as applied to appellant and to demonstrate that the restriction
vindicates that interest through the least restrictive available means." Id. at 647.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Advertising, whether by lawyers or other professionals, is clearly commercial speech to which a qualified privilege applies. In this connection the Supreme
Court's view of the "commercial speech doctrine" rests heavily on the common sense
distinction between commercial free speech and ordinary or other varieties of speech.
Id. at 637; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. The Supreme Court has not distinguished
between types of print advertising and applies the same standard whether the
solicitation appears in a newspaper or in correspondence. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473.
"Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to a general
population his offer to represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield than it could
prohibit his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if
petitioner's letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally
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Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not
concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only
in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only
through means that directly advance that interest. Central
Hudson Gas & Electric, supra, [447 U.S.] at 566. Our application of these principles to the commercial speech of attorneys
has led us to conclude that blanket bans on price advertising
by attorneys and rules preventing attorneys from using nondeceptive terminology to describe their fields of practice are
impermissible, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977); In Re R.M.J., supra, [455 U.S. 191], but that
rules prohibiting in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys
are, at least under some circumstances, permissible, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 77
With respect to the Dalkon Shield advertisement, the Court noted
that the concerns of an in-person solicitation were not present. There
clearly was no invasion of privacy, the use of print media decreased
the likelihood of overreaching or undue influence, and the contact
lacked the coercive effect of a personal contact from a trained

advocate .

7

On the other hand, the failure to list specific information about
the contingent fee arrangement in Zauderer's advertisements regarding
the defense of "drunk driving" cases was held to be within the state's
interest and not constitutionally protected free speech. The Court
reasoned that Ohio's rule requiring specific information to be included
in advertisements did not prevent attorneys from conveying informaprohibit him from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, 'Is
your home being foreclosed on?,' rather than his observation to the targeted
individuals that 'It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed
on."' Id.
77. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638. R.M.J. recognized that even non-deceptive
advertising may be restricted if the restriction was narrowly designed to achieve a
substantial state interest. However, the restriction must be narrowly construed to
meet the state's interest and not impair the constitutional protections.
78. Id. at 642. The court specifically stated that a "printed advertisement,
unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure
on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation. Thus, a printed advertisement is a means of conveying information about
legal services that is more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the
part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney. Accordingly, the
substantial interests that justified the ban on in-person solicitation upheld in Ohralik
cannot justify the discipline imposed on appellant for the content of his advertisement." Id.
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tion to the public, but rather insured that a minimum level of.
information would be communicated to the public.7 9
The Court recognized that burdensome disclosures may "offend"

the first amendment by chilling protected commercial free speech.80
However, the "advertiser's rights [were] adequately protected as long

as disclosure requirements [were] reasonably related to the state's
interest in preventing deception of consumers."'"

Following Zauderer, it became apparent that commercial free
speech could only be restricted in relation to a substantial government

interest. 2 As such, "state rules that are designed to prevent the

potential for deception and confusion . . . may be no broader than
necessary to prevent the perceived evil." 83 In this regard, print advertising presents far less of a potential for abuse.14 The broadly worded
decision in Zauderer regarding the first amendment issue was interpreted by many as a signal that targeted direct mailing to those with
particular legal problems would be upheld as constitutional so long
as they were not deceptive nor misleading. This interpretation was

not far from wrong as indicated by the Court's decision in Shapero

v. Kentucky Bar Association.85
In Shapero, the petitioner applied to the Kentucky Attorneys
Advertising Commission for approval to send targeted, direct mail
letters to prospective clients.8 6 However, such letters violated Kentucky
disciplinary Rule 7.3,87 a blanket prohibition against targeted, direct
mail solicitation without reference to whether the advertisement was
false or misleading.

79. Id. at 650.
80. Id. at 651.
81. Id. at 651. In Zauderer, "[a]ppellants's advertisement informed the public
that 'if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.' The advertisement
makes no mention of the distinction between 'legal fees' and 'costs,' and to a layman
not aware of the meaning of these terms of art, the advertisement would suggest that
employing appellant would be a no-lose proposition in that his representation in a
losing case would come entirely free of charge." Id. at 652.
82. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472. However, untruthful or misleading commercial
speech has never been allowed. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982).
83. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472, quoting, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
84. Id. ("Our lawyer advertising cases have never distinguished among various
modes of written advertising to the general public."). Id. at 473.
85. Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
86. Pursuant to Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.530, "Any attorney who is in doubt as to
the propriety of any professional act contemplated by him . . . may in writing to the
Director petition for an advisory opinion thereon."
87. See, ABA, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 (1984).
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There, the state contended that a ban on direct mail advertising
was necessary due to the "serious potential for abuse inherent in
direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need
specific services."" 8 By analogy to Ohralik, the Kentucky court stated
that direct mail solicitations subjected a prospective client to pressure
in a direct and personal way. "Potential clients feel overwhelmed by
their predicament leading to an impaired capacity for good judgment." 9 According to the Kentucky court, such solicitation constitutes
undue influence, overreaching and intimidation."
However, the Shapero Court believed that a potential client could
be overwhelmed by legal difficulties irrespective of whether he receives
a targeted solicitation, a general solicitation, or an advertisement.
Rather, the inquiry focuses on the nature of the communication.
According to Shapero, print advertising, whether in a newspaper
or a targeted direct mail solicitation, involves much less overreaching
or undue influence than in-person solicitation. Moreover, print advertising is without the coercive effect of a personal contact. With
print advertising, the potential client may simply discard the solicitation. With a personal contact by a skilled advocate, the potential
client cannot as easily escape the solicitation. 91
A letter, like a printed advertisement, (but unlike a lawyer),
can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored,
88. Shapero, 466 U.S. at 474. See, 726 S.W.2d at 299.
89. Id. 466 U.S. at 474.
90. A letter may be misleading if it emphasizes "trivial or relatively uninformative facts, overblown offers of client satisfaction, or pertaining to the quality of
legal services." Id. at 1925.
91. Prohibiting direct mailings to those who might most desire and might most
benefit from an attorney's services runs afoul of the concerns for informed citizenry

that lay at the heart of Bates. See, Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court, 579 F.Supp. 880, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Adams v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission, 801 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 1986),

While the interest of the targeted audience in receiving the information is
strong, the state concerns that underscored the Court's decision in Ohralik
are less pressing with targeted mailings than with in-person solicitation. In
this connection, individuals are less subject to harassment, overreaching and
duress through mailings than they are through direct personal contact. It is
easier to throw out unwanted mail than an uninvited guest. A letter may be
read through several times and its contents reflected upon before a decision
is made. As the Court stated in Zauderer,, 105 S.Ct. at 2277, "[lI]n most
cases, [print advertising] will lack the coercive force of the personal presence
of a trained advocate. In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a personal
encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the
potential client for a yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation."
Id. at 973.
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or discarded. In short, both types of written solicitation
"conve[y] information about legal services [by means] that
[are] more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice
on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by
an attorney." Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S., at 642, 105 S.Ct.,
at 2277.92
The Court noted that direct mail solicitation is far less intrusive and
aggressive than an in-person contact. Furthermore, in comparing
direct mail solicitations to matters of general circulation, the Court
found there is no difference in the degree of intrusion. The invasion,
if any, arises when the lawyer discovers the recipient's legal difficulties, not when he contacts the potential client by mail. 93
As the direct mail correspondence is personal, as opposed to
newspaper advertisements which are not, the contact presents an
increased potential for deception, either intentional or inadvertent.
It could in certain circumstances, lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer's familiarity with the case or could implicitly
suggest that the recipient's legal problem is more dire than it
really is . . . .Similarly, an inaccurately targeted letter could
lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she
does not actually have or, worse yet, could offer erroneous
legal advice. See e.g., Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39
Cal. 3d 609, 619-620, 217 Cal.Rptr. 423, 429, 704 P.2d 183,
475 U.S. 1001, 106 S.Ct. 1170,
189 (1985), summarily dism'd,
94
89 L.Ed.2d 290 (1986).
This danger, however, can be ameliorated by supervision over direct
mail solicitation by the appropriate regulatory body. 95 Though such
screening will result in an increased workload for such regulatory
groups, 96 the Shapero Court dismissed this argument, finding there
92. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-476.
93. Id. at 476.
94. Id. at 476.
95. This supervision may include a warning or disclaimer tending to decrease
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception. In Re R.M.J., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) at 939. See, Id. at 76 (The requirement that advertisements be filed with the
body regulating attorneys is a reasonable exercise of supervision). Adams, supra note
87, at 974.
96. In its comment to Rule 7.3, the ABA House of Delegates expressed its
concerns:
"State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate
specific complaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers' mail

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. I I

was insufficient support for the proposition that such scrutiny would
be overly burdensome. 97

But "[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial speech have

been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial

information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-

be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from
the harmful." Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S., at 646, 105 S.Ct.,
at 2279.98

While targeted direct mail solicitation is permissible, the communication still may be prohibited if false or misleading. 99 Notably,
the use of large and bold type, underscoring and eye-catching style,
do not constitute deceptive speech as it presents no risk of overreaching. 00 Instead the Court continued to emphasize the mode of communication used stating:
The relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients

whose "condition" makes them susceptible to undue influence,
but whether the mode of communication poses a serious

10
danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility. 1

solicitation material. Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff
members are unlikely to know anything about the lawyer or about the
prospective client's underlying problem. Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer's representations are misleading." ABA,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, pp. 93-94 (1984).
97. Shapero, 466 U.S. at 477.

98. Id. The court continued its reasoning finding that as a general matter,
evaluating a targeted advertisement does not require specific information about the
recipient's identity and legal problems any more than evaluating a newspaper advertisement requires like information about all readers. If the targeted letter specifies
facts that relate to particular recipients (e.g., "It has come to my attention that your
home is being foreclosed on"), the reviewing agency has innumerable options to
minimize mistakes.
99. Discipline is permissible in the instance of false or misleading solicitations.
In Re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191 at 203.

100. In Shapero, [t]he letter's liberal use of underscored, uppercase letters (e.g.,
"Call NOW, don't wait"; "it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling") "fairly
shouts at the recipient... that he should employ Shapero." Id., at 19. Second,
respondent objects that the letter contains assertions (e.g., "It may surprise you what
I may be able to do for you") that "stat[e] no affirmative or objective fact," but
constitute "pure salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits
Shapero to nothing. Shapero, 466 U.S. at 478.
101. Shapero, 466 U.S. at 474.
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In sum, Shapero considered whether targeted, direct solicitation approached the level of overreaching present in personal contacts and
concluded that it did not. Rather, the Court found targeted direct
mail, by analogy, similar to that of printed advertisements. As such,
the dangers associated with face-to-face solicitations are lacking.
Targeted direct mail advertising, therefore, is protected commercial
speech provided that it is not false or misleading.
The Shapero Court's extension of First Amendment protection
to targeted direct mailings that are neither false nor misleading is
reflective of the seemingly predominate view that the practice of law
is both a profession and a business,'0 2 as well as a highly competitive
03
commercial enterprise. ,
VI.

THE LIMITS OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING UNDER ILLINOIS LAW

On February 8, 1990 the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the new4
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, effective August 1, 1990.10
While a significant change has not taken place with respect to advertising and solicitation, a significant shift in emphasis has occurred.'0
Illinois Rule 7.1 contains a prohibition of false and misleading communications concerning the lawyer's services, in line with the United
States Supreme Court's decisions on point. Additionally, the Rules
ban in-person solicitation with the exception of few narrow, instances.
Apart from the new ethical rules, Illinois decisional law has tracked
the logic underlying the Bates-Shapero continuum.
A.

ILLINOIS PROHIBITS PERSONAL SOLICITATIONS

Illinois courts have long recognized the distinction between personal solicitations by attorneys and certain forms of print advertising.
In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum,1°6 the court cited
to "undisputed evidence" that "all personal injury lawyers in Chicago
had solicitors out."' 0 7 This, the court noted, was no justification,
102. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, "Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services" 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1084, 1112,(1983)
citing Nelson, Practice Privilege, Social Charge and The Social Structure of Large
Law Firms, 1981 Am. B. Fund. Res. J. 97.
103. Id.
104. Overton, George, The New Rules of Professional Conduct - Ethics Get A
New Foundation, Chicago Bar Record, April 1990.
105. Id.
106. 341 Ill. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930).
107. Id. at 590, 173 N.E. at 831.
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however, for using a runner. 1°8 The court recognized, however, that
not all forms of advertising were to be considered unethical or
unprofessional. For example, distributing business cards or reference
lists would pass scrutiny under certain circumstances. 109 However,
[t]he dividing line between advertisements of that character
and advertisements by means of business cards circulated
among men who are in urgent need of an attorney to safeguard
their interests, by persons who are paid a fixed salary, not
contingent upon their success in procuring clients, and where
no fraud or misrepresentation is used, is exceedingly narrow.
In each case the money expended by the attorney is for the
object of bringing his name to the attention of persons in need
of legal services." 0
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized an additional distinction
in the area of personal solicitations when it decided In re Mitgang."'
In In re Mitgang, the attorney used runners to solicit personal injury
cases. Though he was found not guilty of dividing fees with runners
and chasers who solicited clients, the court noted a clear distinction
between solicitation involving agents and runners who "[stir] up strife
or litigation for a stipulated consideration or a contingent fee,"" 2 and
those instances where attorneys obtain business through friends." 3
In In Re Nesselson," 4 the respondent was found guilty of violating
several of the Canons of Ethics of the Illinois State Bar and the
Chicago Bar Association in that he solicited personal injury cases.
Canon 27 barred, among other things, solicitation of professional
employment by circulars or advertisements or by personal communications or interviews not waranted by personal relations." 5 Additionally, Canon 28 provided:
"It is disputable . . . to breed litigation by seekng out those
whose claims for personal injuries ... in order to secure them

as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes,
or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or
influence the bringing of such cases to his office or to renu108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 590, 173 N.E. at 831.

Id. at 591, 173 N.E. at 831.
Id. at 591, 173 N.E. at 832.
385 I11.311, 52 N.E.2d 807 (1944).
Id. at 332, 52 N.E.2d at 816.
See In re Damisch, 38 Ill. 2d 195, 207-08, 230 N.E.2d 254, 261 (1967).
35 111. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966).

115. Id.at 439, 220 N.E.2d at 411.
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merate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal,
the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services."
The respondent sent out form letters soliciting personal injury
work. Each letter stated it was being "written as a result of or in
acknowledgement or in response to a previous contact with the
respondent's office.""16 Respondent conceded, however, that never in
fact had a recepient of the form letter contacted him or his office
17
prior to a letter being sent.'
In finding the respondent guilty of violating the Canons of Ethics,
the court held that a three year suspension from the practice of law
was neither drastic, severe or unwarranted." '
Similarly, the respondent in In Re Bossov," 9 received a three year
suspension from the practice of law for soliciting personal injury
claims. The Court also found the respondent guilty of failing to
''account properly and pay over amounts due clients on settlements
reached and with settling cases without having consulted with cli20
ents.'"
Notably, two judges dissented maintaining there was insufficient
evidence to support the three year sanction. The dissenting judges
found it significant that none of the respondent's clients were dissatisfied with the services provided by the respondent. Moreover, all of
the clients apparently sought the respondent's services voluntarily.' 2
A more recent case is In Re Teichner22 which involved the
propriety of an in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. A railroad
derailment had occurred in Laurel, Mississippi. In response, a local
minister established a comprehensive relief program for the injured.
Soon after the occurrence agents of the railroad began contacting the
injured and settling cases. The minister believed the settlements to be
inadequate, and invited Teichner to counsel the injured. 23

116. Id.at 457, 220 N.E.2d at 410.
117. Id. at 457, 220 N.E.2d at 410.

118. Id. at 462, 220 N.E.2d at 412.
119. 60 11. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928.
120. Id. at 440, 328 N.E.2d at 310.

121. Id. at 448, 328 N.E.2d at 314 (Kluczynski J., dissenting).
122. 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979), cert. den, Teichner v. Attorney

Registration & Disciplinary Committee, 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
123. Id.at 95-96, 387 N.E.2d at 267.
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The Illinois Supreme Court viewed Teichner's in-person solicitation as falling between the expanse manifest by Ohralik and Primus.2
As many of the in-person solicitations were at the introduction of the
minister,1 25 the court found the solicitations to be constitutionally
protected. In doing so, the court gave weight to the special circumstances involved. For example, the court found it crucial that, in
turning to the respondent for help, Rev. Johnson was not "attempting
to create a facade or device designed to facilitate the respondent's
solicitation of remunerative employment." 26 "[R]ather, he was acting
as part of a bona fide relief effort created to further an interest
independent'''27 of the respondent's pecuniary interest. Accordingly,
"even though Teichner's motives were predominantly pecuniary, his
conduct served to further the interests of Rev. Johnson's community,
and a blanket prohibition of all contact between respondent and that
community would not pass constitutional muster."' 2 In this vein, the
Court refused to prohibit all in-person solicitation, stating:
For all its abuses and excesses (see Pocius v. Halvorsen (1963),
30 Ill. 2d 73, 83, [195 N.E.2d 137]), the contingent-fee system
remains almost the only route to the court-house for individuals of moderate means. (See In re Estate of Harnetiaux
(1968), 91 111. App. 2d 222, 228, [234 N.E.2d 81].) To deny
Rev. Johnson's community the use of such attorneys to consult
with the injured and their families on- an individual basis
would be to shut that community off from the most important,
if not the only, source of the legal counsel they needed but
could not afford. There is no evidence that, with regard to
Ward, respondent's conduct involved any of the substantive
evils against which the prohibition of in-person solicitation
traditionally is directed. Nor was respondent's offer of financial assistance necessarily improper. This court long ago rejected any rule which would permit indigent plaintiffs to be
forced into a hasty, inadequate settlement by their indigence.
(People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. McCallum (1930),
341 Ill. 578, 589, [173 N.E. 8271. Accord Bounougias v. Peters
(1964), 49 Ill. App. 2d 138, 154, [198 N.E.2d 142]. But cf.
124.
125.
126.
436 U.S.
127.

Id.at 102, 103, 387 N.E.2d at 270, 271.
See supra, notes 103-108.
In Re Teichner, 75 I1. 2d at 104, 387 N.E.2d at 271, Cf. In Re Primus,
at 428 n. 20 (no evidence of "sham").
Teichner, 75 111. 2d at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 271.

128. Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
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generally Annot. 8 A.L.R.3d 1155 (1966).) Accordingly, we
deem it inappropriate to impose discipline for respondent's
29
conduct with respect to Sears Ward.1
However, Teichner solicited clients at a second disaster, this time
in Decatur, Illinois. There, Teichner offered to pay a local resident
for the names of injured persons and contacted other injured parties
to solicit their cases. The court differentiated the Decatur solicitation
from that in Laurel, as the Decatur incident furthered the associational
rights of no person or group. 30 The court held that a purely commercial expression such as the solicitation by Teichner in Decatur is
more conducive to restriction due solely to the pecuniary interest by
the attorney. Such actions, therefore, can be constitutionally prohibited as a prophylactic measure to prevent overreaching. 3' Following
Teichner, it is clear that Illinois forbids the in-person solicitation of
clients either directly or through an intermediary.
B. ILLINOIS PERMITS DIRECT MAIL AND PRINT ADVERTISING

While not allowing in-person solicitations, Illinois has an established history of allowing print advertising that is not misleading.
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Berezniak,3 2 involved advertising
wherein an attorney provided testimonials and recommendations containing extravagant praise of his ability and past performance. Although the attorney was reprimanded, the Court held that not all
forms of advertising were unethical or unprofessional. Rather, the
publication and circulation of ordinary business cards was not prohibited if limited to a simple statement of the attorney's name,
location, and a statement of his specialty provided that publication
of the specialty is not prohibited by law. Following Berezniak, it was
clear that non-misleading print advertising was permitted provided
that it did not contain statements of ability or past performance.
However, personal solicitations, even by intermediaries, were prohibited.
129. Id. at 105-06, 387 N.E.2d at 272.
130. Id. at 108, 387 N.E.2d at 273. "The mere fact that the respondent thought
he had been able to manipulate one of Mrs. Garner's friends to introduce him to the
Garners was insufficient to justify his having contacted them without an indication
of interest on their part." Id. at 109, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
131. "The restriction of the former, the court held, could include a prohibition
of in-person solicitation, as a prophylactic measure to prevent fraud, undue influence,
intimidation, overreaching and other forms of vexatious conduct." Id. at 102, 387
N.E.2d 270 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-67 (1988)).

132. 292 Ill. 305, 127 N.E. 36 (1920).
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A novel advertisement placed by an attorney provided the background for In the Matter of Jafree.'33 The advertisement portrayed
an impending trial as a play, with the respondent in the starring role.
While the Court did not reach the issue of whether or not the
advertisement could form the basis for a disciplinary proceeding, the
Court did conclude that the advertisement was protected by the First
Amendment, and therefore, could not be grounds for contempt.
The Court specifically addressed the issue of targeted direct mail
solicitation in Adams v. Attorney Registration and DisciplinaryCommission. 3 4 In that case Plaintiffs-Appellee relied upon targeted direct
mail advertising to solicit potential clients, in violation of Disciplinary
Rule 2-103(b)(2).11 Anticipating the ruling in Shapero, the Adams
Court struck down the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission prohibition against printed direct mailings, reasoning that
"prohibiting direct mailings to those who might most desire and might
most benefit from an attorney's services run afoul of the concerns
for an informed citizenry that lay at the heart of Bates.' ' 36 Furthermore, the state's interest in protecting against overreaching was less
in the context of printed advertisements as compared to in-person
solicitation. A further distinction noted by the court was the ease with
which printed advertisements could be policed, as opposed to inperson solicitations. While noting that all misleading advertisement
may be banned, the prohibition at issue was overbroad and affected
important individual interests.
The Court had the benefit of the Shapero decision in deciding In
re Komar.'37 There the Court found that the Respondent had violated
DR 2-103, prohibiting the use of deceptive statements and preventing
attorneys from recommending or soliciting employment of themselves
by private communication. 3 ' At issue were fliers, advertisements and
133. 741 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1984).
134. 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois law).
135. The rule provided in part:
(b) A lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client in the following
circumstances:
(2) by written communication distributed generally to persons not known in
a specific matter to require such legal services as the lawyer offers to
provide but who in general might find such services to be useful and
providing that such letters and circulars and the envelopes containing
them are plainly labeled as advertising material.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 11OA, para. 2-103(b)(2)(1985).
136. Adams, 801 F.2d at 973.
137. 125 Ill. 2d 427, 532 N.E.2d 801 (1988).
Rev. Stat. ch. I10A, para. 2-103(a) (1985).
138. Ill.
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other solicitations that were sent by a corporation (of which the
respondent owned a 25% interest) to homeowners facing pending
mortgage foreclosure actions filed in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. The respondent was aware of the mailings and had reviewed
them prior to distribution.
Relying on Shapero, the Court concluded that these solicitations
could not be deemed constitutionally protected speech. In contrast to
Shapero, where the solicitations were truthful and non-misleading,
Komar's solicitations were deceptive.
The solicitations at issue in Komar failed to disclose that payment
of the $1,000 fee typically would result in a referral to a bankruptcy
attorney and that the customer would be required to pay an additional
fee to that independent attorney. Also misleading was the fact that
some of the solicitations were signed in the name of fictitious signatories who were purportedly the corporation's representatives. Moreover, the solicitations contained assertions based upon past performance
or which predicted future events, contained statements as to the
quality of services, and were likely to attract clients by the use of
striking language. 1a9
While conceding that a state cannot "categorically prohibit solicitation of legal employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements
containing information or advice regarding a specific legal problem if
truthful and non-deceptive,"' 4 the Court reiterated that a state may
prohibit commercial speech that is "potentially or demonstrably"
misleading. 14l Given that the solicitations were false and misleading,
the Court found the solicitations to be without First Amendment
protection.
C.

THE ADVERTISING OF ATTORNEY CERTIFICATION

In Re Peel,142 involved an attorney billing himself, on his letterhead, as a civil trial specialist certified by the National Board of Trial
Advocacy, in derogation of an Illinois disciplinary rule. 43 In response
to the constitutional challenge, the Illinois Attorney Registration and
139. Id. at 440, 532 N.E.2d at 807-808.
140. Id. at 442-3, 532 N.E.2d at 809, quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
141. Id. quoting R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 at 202 (1982).
142. 126 Ill.2d 397, 534 N.E.2d 980 (1989). See, Gibbons, The Right to Specialize, 76 ABA Journal 56 (May 1990).
143. Rule 2-105 (3) prohibits a lawyer from holding himself out as a "certified"
or a "specialist" except for patent, trademark or admiralty attorneys. Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. I1OA, para. 2-105(3)(1985)
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Disciplinary Commission held that such designations were "misleading" and therefore beyond constitutional protection.
The Court held that the "designation of Peel as a 'Certified Trial
Specialist' was misleading for three reasons. First, the claim of
certification impinges upon the State's right to be the sole licensing
body for attorneys. Too, the term "certified" had a similar meaning
144
to the term "licensed," making it appear to have official sanction.
Third, the term "certification" implied that Illinois had authorized
the certification of trial specialists. 145 Because the designation of
"specialist" on counsel's letterhead could be misleading, it was properly prohibited.
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,

holding that a "potentially misleading" statement could not give rise
to a categorical ban. 14 The plurality held that the Petitioner's letterhead was not misleading, but was instead "potentially" misleading.
Drawing upon the unanimous decision in R.M.J.,14 7 the Court bal-

anced the individual's First Amendment rights against the intrusive

nature of the state's regulatory scheme.
Finding no evidence supporting the Illinois Supreme Court's view
that Peel's letterhead was misleading, the plurality dismissed this
contention focusing instead on the potentially misleading nature of

the communication. The issue, then, was the individual's limited First
Amendment rights balanced against the state's interest. The plurality

held that the potentially misleading communication "does not satisfy
the state's heavy burden of justifying a categorical prohibition against

144. "The general public could be misled to believe that the respondent may
practice in the field of trial advocacy solely because he is certified by the NBTA."
Peel, 126 Ill.2d at 406, 534 N.E.2d at 536.
145. Peel, 126 Ill.2d at 406, 534 N.E.2d at 983-84.
146. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 58
U.S.L.W. 4684 (No. 88-1775 June 4, 1990). The Court issued a fractured opinion,
divided into three camps: the plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Kennedy; the concurring opinion written by
Justice Marshall and joined by Justice Brennan together with Justice White's dissent;
and the dissent written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia.
147. "Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely, But the states may not
place an absolute prohibition on certain types of misleading information, e.g., a
listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is
not deceptive ....

Even when a communication is not misleading, the state retains some authority
to regulate. But the state must assert a substantial interest and the interference with
speech must be in proportion to the interest served." Id. at 4687, citing R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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the dissemination of accurate, factual information to the public."'' 41
The touchstone was the truthful nature of the communication.
The Court recognized that unscrupulous attorneys could hold
themselves out as being "certified" when they actually were not. But
because such information is readily ascertainable, the potential for
abuse did not warrant a categorical ban. Instead, states could determine or "screen" which certification bodies were bona fide and which
were shams. Alternatively or in conjunction, the state could require a
disclaimer. On balance, the state had the means to regulate attorney
certification which made a categorical ban excessive, overly intrusive
and unconstitutional.
The concurring opinion agreed that the Petitioner's letterhead
was potentially misleading. But citing to R.M.J., the justices observed:
States may prohibit actually or inherently misleading commercial speech entirely. In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
They may not, however, ban potentially misleading commercial speech if narrower limitations could be crafted to ensure
49
that the information is presented in a nonmisleading manner.
In this connection, a statement on a letterhead does not present the
same concerns as "face-to-face" barratry.'5 0
Justice O'Connor's dissent, conversely, holds that the communication was misleading as the term "certified" implies a standard of
quality. Moreover, the proximity of the terms "Licensed: Illinois,
Missouri, Arizona" with the claim of NBTA Certification, on Peel's
letterhead, might lead the consumer to believe that the state sanctioned
the certification. The O'Connor dissent considered the disclaimer issue
voiced by other members of the Court, but noted that a disclaimer
would require three discrete pieces of information:
(1) that the claim to certification does not necessarily indicate
that the attorney provides higher quality representation than
those who are not certified; (2) that the certification is not
state-sanctioned; and (3) either the criteria for certification or
a reasonable means by which the consumer could determine
what those criteria are."'
148. Id., 58 U.S.L.W. at 4689.
149. Id. at 4690.

150. Justice White agrees with Justice Marshall but would affirm as Peel's
letterhead did not carry a disclaimer. Id. at 4692. However, Justice Marshall would
require the attorney to provide further information, including a disclaimer "in order
to prevent the claim from being misleading."
151. Id. at 4694.
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The dissent suggests that such a disclaimer is unworkable. But more,
the state would be required to engage in case-by-case evaluations of
disclaimers in order to adequately protect the public. Alternatively,
state's would be required to screen each organization and provide
their own disclaimer for each organization. While noting that this
information would be helpful to consumers, "the constitution does
not require states to go to these extremes to protect their citizens from
And according to the dissent, "If the information
deception."'.
cannot be presented in a way that is not deceptive, even statements
that are merely potentially misleading may be regulated with an
absolute prohibition.'
The rule, post-Peel, is that certifications may be advertised
provided that they are true, are not derivative of sham organizations
and are not likely to confuse the public. If such communications are
potentially misleading, prudence may require a disclaimer. Finally,
states may regulate which organizations may be advertised by attorneys, based upon whether those organizations are bona fide or not.
CONCLUSION

With the Court's decision in Shapero, case law in the area of
attorney advertising has evolved to the point where non-deceptive and
truthful written advertisements, including, targeted direct-mail solicitation, are provided virtual per se protection under the First Amendment. This position is further strengthened by the Peel decision
affording potentially misleading statements First Amendment protection. The States' interest in regulating attorney advertising, however,
does not go unrecognized. The Court advocates certain forms of
regulation, and has upheld disclosure requirements that are reasonably
related to the states interests.' 5 4 For example, the Court has suggested
A further
that general mailings be identified as advertisements.'
suggestion is the requirement that a lawyer prove the truth of the
contents of her advertisement or require her to explain how she
discovered the fact and verified its accuracy.' 5 6 The Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, adopted by the Supreme Court on February 8,
1990, reflect the Court's concern in protecting the First Amendment
rights of attorneys. Furthermore, the Rules incorporate some of the
Court's regulatory suggestions.
152. Id. at 4694.
153. Id. citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
154. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
155. R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
156. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
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While divergent views in the propriety of attorney advertising
still exist, the Court has provided the legal profession with a fairly
clear road map as to what is or is not protected conduct. Regardless
of what camp one may be in with respect to the attorney advertising
issue, the recent Supreme Court decisions and the adoption of the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct make it easier for Illinois to
regulate such conduct while at the same time providing the legal
profession with the same First Amendment protection afforded other
professions.

